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Martin Dufwenberg & Uri Gneezy**
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ABSTRACT:
We experimentally investigate he nature of strategic interaction in a 2-player game. Player 1
may take x Dutch guilders (f x) and end the game (player 2 then gets f 0), or let player 2 split f
20 between the players. x is a treatment variable taking values of f 4, 7, 10, 13, and 16.
      We find that most players 2 "give away" positive amounts (f6 on average), but their
choices are independent of x. We explicitly measure the players' beliefs and find that many
players 1 expect to get back no more than f x but nevertheless let player 2 split the f 20, and
that the behavior by the players 2 is consistent with a theory of a guilt based on psychological
game theory.
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Ariel Rubinstein, and Oded Stark for helpful suggestions, eminar participants in Oslo for a stimulating
discussion, and Jos Jansen and Wim Koevoets for assistance during the experimental sessions. Dufwenberg
gratefully acknowledges financial support from the European Union's HCM-Network project "Games and
Markets", organized by Helmut Bester.
** CentER for Economic Research, Tilburg University, P.O. Box 90153, 5000 LE Tilburg. +31-13-4663262
(MD), +31-13-4662718 (UG), +31-13-4663066 (fax), martin.dufwenberg@kub.nl, gneezy@kub.nl (e-mails).
2
I. INTRODUCTION
Suppose you find a wallet in the street. No one sees you. The wallet contains money, and
some other stuff which is of apparent value to the owner but of no use to you. You can either
keep the wallet for yourself, or bring it to a nearby police station for the owner to pick up. The
police will routinely register your name, and subsequently ask the wallet owner to reimburse
you in the amount he considers appropriate. What would you do?
It is commonly assumed in economics that people are motivated only by material, self-
centered concerns. In the above situation such an assumption leads to an inefficient outcome.
The owner will not reimburse the finder if he picks his wallet up at he police station. The
finder figures this out and simply keeps the wallet. Both these persons would prefer that the
owner gets back the wallet and reimburses the finder sufficiently.
By contrast, experimental evidence suggests that, when humans interact, various non-
material considerations often become relevant. In some cases these may eliminate inefficiency.
To address related issues, we experimentally investigate the nature of strategic behavior in a
sequential game which may be thought of as a "lost wallet game" because in a sense it models
the above situation.1 Formally, we refer to the game as Γ(x), and in the benchmark version










In Γ(x), x∈(0,1) is exogenously given and y∈[0,1] is an object of choice for player 2. The
game starts with player 1 choosing Take or Leave. If he chooses Take the game ends and the
                                           
1 The monetary payoffs of Γ(x) qualitatively match the payoff related to the wallet's contents. Of course, if
additional non-material concerns are payoff relevant these need not be identical in the two cases. Nevertheless
we find the comparison intriguing, and we thank Tone Ognedal for suggesting it.
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payoffs are x and 0 to player 1 and player 2 respectively. If 1 chooses Leave, then 2 is called
upon to move. 2 chooses y∈[0,1] and the subsequent payoffs are y and 1-y. If the monetary
payoffs coincide with the players' real payoffs, then clearly if 2 is called upon to move she
should choose y=0. If 1 figures this out he should choose Take at the root. This outcome is
inefficient since if 1 chooses Leave and 2 chooses y such that x<y<1, then a payoff vector will
be realized which is better for both players.
We let subjects engage in anonymous, one-shot plays of an experimental game
corresponding to Γ(x). The monetary value of the unit pie to be split by player 2 is held fixed
at 20 Dutch guilders (f 20).2 We use x as the (only) treatment variable taking values of f 4, 7,
10, 13, and 16. We want to draw conclusions about the motivations behind the subjects
behavior and therefore xplicitly measure some of the players' beliefs about one another's
actions and beliefs. We do this by asking the subjects to make certain guesses about other
subject choices or guesses, rewarding them for accuracy (see Appendix 3).
The hypotheses we t st relate to issues of efficiency (in monetary values), reciprocity,
and guilt. We now discuss these issues in turn. An efficient outcome obtains if and only if 1
chooses Leave. We investigate whether 1's propensity to choose Leave depends on x, and test
the hypothesis that efficiency is achieved only when player 1 expects to earn more than x.
We say that player 2 is affected by reciprocity considerations if she chooses y>0
because she feels that 1 is "nice" by choosing Leave and she then has a preference for being
"nice in return". One might argue that the higher is x, the nicer is 1 by choosing Leave since
the potential loss he may incur by doing so is higher. We expect an effect of this kind to
motivate the subjects in their decision making and that therefore y is positively correlated with
x. We test, and expect to reject, the alternative hypothesis of no correlation between x and y.
Player 2 may choose y>0 also for reasons not related to reciprocity. We investigate
specifically whether 2 has some preference for "not letting 1 down", in the sense that she feels
guilty if she chooses y "too low" relative to what she believes that 1 expects to get back.
Player 2 does not know 1's expectation of y, but we measure her expectation of 1's
                                           
2 At the time of the experiment (March 1996) 20 Dutch guilder was worth approximately 12 US dollars.
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expectation of y (conditional on 1 choosing Leave) and test the hypothesis that this second-
order expectation is positively correlated with y.
Note that if such an effect is relevant this indicates hat 2's subjectively perceived
payoff depends not only on what strategy profile is implemented (as in standard game theory)
but also on her beliefs. Psychological game theory (Geanakoplos, Pearce & Stacchetti, 1989)
offers a framework for formalizing such effects. We devote some attention below (Section
IV.C) to discussing whether our results can be interpreted from that perspective, and if so
how.
We now compare our approach to some related literature: Γ(x) is related to the
Dictator game in which one player decides how to divide a unit of payoff between himself and
another (dummy) player. The subgame of Γ(x) where 2 moves, considered in isolation, has
precisely such a structure. One perspective one might have on our study is that we investigate
the potential importance of some non-pecuniary concerns that arise due to a choice that
precedes a dictator subgame.3 When the Dictator game is tested in experiments, with monetary
payoffs controlled, "the dictator" quite often gives away more than zero, which is typically
explained with reference to altruism or fairness considerations (see Davis & Holt 1993, pp
263–9 for a discussion). We suspect that 2's behavior will be affected by similar concerns in
Γ(x), but that in addition it may matter that whether 2's subgame is reached or not is at 1's
discretion.
Berg, Dickhaut, & McCabe (1995) analyze a "trust game" which shares many features
with Γ(x): Player 1 is given a sum of money. He chooses how much to keep and "sends" the
rest to player 2. The amount sent is r pled and given to player 2 who chooses how much to
"send back".4 Bolle (1995) reports from an experiment involving a game which resembles
                                           
3 This is in contrast to the Ultimatum game, in which an action is added that succeeds a proposed dictator
division. In the Ultimatum game the "other" player gets to accept or reject the proposed split, and in the latter
case, each player gets a zero payoff. The Ultimatum game invokes a feature of pot ntial revenge; the responder
may punish the divider if he feels he is being treated unfair. See Camerer & Thaler (1995) and Güth (1995) for
detailed discussions. See Güth & van Damme (1994) for a report on an experiment on a game which
incorporates essential elements of b th the Dictator and the Ultimatum game.
4 Γ(x) can be related to Berg et al's game as follows: In Γ(x) player 1 is given a certain amount (x) of money.
He then chooses to send all or nothing to player 2. For any x>0, the amount sent is then multiplied by the
factor 1/x and given to player 2 who then makes a choice on how much money to "send back" to player 1. Γ(x)
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Γ(x), except that an element of chance was dded. A lottery was conducted to select four out
of the 64 experimental games that were played, and only the subjects acting in these games
were rewarded according to their decisions.5 Bolle set x=½ and did not consider the effect of
changing x. In both of these studies, most subjects did not behave according to the subgame
perfect equilibrium with only self-interested material considerations affecting payoffs.6
In closing this introduction we emphasize that perhaps the most crucial feature of our
study is that we measure some of the players' expectations. This allows us to draw some
inferences regarding the players motivations, and to tie our findings explicitly to ideas from
psychological game theory.7 Psychological game theory enriches the scope of the strategic
analysis by allowing emotional considerations (in our case guilt) to affect strategic decision
making. Berg et al (1995, p139) stress the importance of using ideas of this type to explain
experimental findings.
Section II explains the experimental procedure. Section III presents the ypothesis we
test, and the experimental results. Section IV contains a discussion of our main findings.
Appendices 1-3 contain the subjects' instructions.
II. EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURE
The subjects were recruited via an ad in the weekly students' newspaper at Tilburg University
and via posters on campus. These announcements invited subjects to come to our offices and
"sign up" for an economic experiment on decision making. We indicated that the subjects'
earnings would depend on these decisions, and approximately how much money was at stake.
                                                                                                                                   
may be viewed as more general than Berg et al's game in allowing not only x=1/3, and more special in not
allowing player 1 to send intermediate amounts.
5  See Bolle (1990) for a discussion of whether such a set-up skews incentives relative to the case where all
subjects are paid.
6 Several other authors have conducted experimental studies in which aspects of efficiency and reciprocity are
key features. See e.g. Fehr, Kirchsteiger, & Riedl (1993), Fehr, Gächter & Kirchsteiger (1995), Güth,
Ockenfels & Wendel (1994), van der Heijden, Nelissen, Potters, & Verbon (1996), and  McKelvey & Palfrey
(1992). However, these experiments are r latively less closely related to ours (various real world market
institutions are mimicked, there is no "Dictator subgame", or there are more stages).
7 Bolle (1995) measures something similar to 1's expectation of y, but not 2's expectation of 1's expectation of
y which turns out to be the crucial expectation from a psychological games perspective.
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In total we had 5 sessions, with 12 different pairs of students in each. x was fixed
within a session and was changed between sessions to Dutch guilders (f) 4, 7, 10, 13, 16. For
each session we had invited 13 subjects to Ro m A, 13 subjects to Room B, and 4 extra
subjects to a third room to cover for no-shows. After filling Rooms A and B with 13 subjects
(using subjects from the third room room if necessary) these where given an "Introduction"
(see Appendix 1). Then, they took an envelope at random. In each room,  12 envelopes
contained 12 different numbers (A1,..,A12 in Room A and B1,..,B12 in Room B). These
numbers were called "registration numbers". One envelope was labeled "Monitor", and
determined who was the person who checked that we do not cheat. That person was paid the
average of all other subjects participating in that session. After opening the envelopes the
second part of the instruction was distributed (see Appendix 2). At this point it was stressed
by the experimenter that this game will be played only once.
Subjects in Room A read the instruction for this part (see Appendix 2.). They were
then asked to go to the experimenter, one at a time. They got an envelope with fx in it, and
then had to go behind a curtain. Over there they had to decide whether to take the money out
of the envelope or not. Then to write their registration number on a ote, to put this note in
the envelope, and to put the envelope in a box near the experimenter.
Subjects in Room B also read the instructions for this part (see Appendix 2). They
were asked to write down how much they would give to their anonymous counterpart in
Room A (i.e. to choose y), conditional on him/her choosing to leave th  fx in the envelope.8
The subjects' choices, sealed in envelopes, were put in a box near the experimenter.
                                           
8 Note that we ask the players to report strategies; each player makes one choice for each information set he
possesses. The advantage of this approach is that the experimenter can record behavior at all information sets,
whether these are being reached or not. However, we note that since a player is not faced with the fait accompli
of reaching a certain information set, and this may affect his behavior. See Roth (1995, pp322-3) for a
discussion. The idea of asking for strategies in experiments goes back to Selten (1967). It has recently been
used for example by Mitzkewitz & Nagel (1993). Investigating to what extent behavior is affected by the
strategy method may be an interesting topic for future research.
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Then part 2 started. The subjects in Room A received new instructions (see Appendix
3, also for the incentive scheme used) in which they were asked to guess the average y chosen
by subjects in Room B at part 1.9
The participants in Room B also received new instructions (see App ndix 3), in which
they were asked to guess the average guess of the subjects in Room A who chose to leave the
money in the envelope in part 1. Meanwhile, an experimenter and the two monitors checked
and recorded the nvelopes of Room A, and matched them each with an envelope from Room
B (as described in the instructions). In the end, all the payoffs from part 1 and 2 were
calculated and the subjects were paid.10
III. HYPOTHESES AND RESULTS
We now present the hypotheses we test and report on our experimental findings. The raw data
is given in Tables 1 and 2.
[Insert Tables 1 and 2 here]
The following two hypotheses should find support if subjects behave according to the
"classical solution" (subgame perfect equilibrium when each player's payoff depends only on
his monetary reward):
H0: All players 1 choose Take
                                           
9 We want to measure 1's expectation of the y chosen by his co-player, but nevertheless ask 1 to guess the
average choice of y in the whole session. We believe this creates a superior measure. Say, for example, that a
subject believes that the co-player will choose y=0 with probability ½ and otherwise choose y=f10. Such a
subject has an expectation of 5. With the incentive scheme we use he should indeed guess f5. Had we asked
him to guess his co-players choice he should guess either f0 or f10, however.
10 Note that while the interacting subjects were anonymous to each ot er, they were not anonymous vis-à-vis
the experimenter. Hoffman, McCabe, Shachat, & Smith (1994) report experimental evidence to the effect that
if subjects are anonymous also vis-à-vis the experimenter non-monetary concerns will become less important
than otherwise. However, a subsequent study by Bolton & Zwick (1995) suggests that while there is some truth
to this claim, the differences are rather small and qualitatively results do not differ so much. See Roth (1995,
pp 298-302) for further discussion.
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H1: All players 2 choose y=0
Recall that twelve different pairs of subjects interacted in each treatment. Table 3 summarizes
for each treatment how many subjects behaved according to the classical solution, and in how
many games the classical solution was played  (e.g: in the f4 treatment, none out of the twelve
players 1 chose Take. In the f16 treatment, the classical profile (Take, y=0) was played in two
out of twelve games).
f 4 f 7 f 10 f 13 f 16
# of Take 0 6 4 8 11
# of y=0 1 4 2 2 3
# of (Take, y=0) 0 3 0 2 2
TABLE 3: Number of choices made according to the classical solution in each treatment.
It is clear by inspection of the table that the hypotheses H0 and H1 do not find much support.
Note also that the classical solution was implemented in only 7 (=0+3+0+2+2) out of the 60
games that were played.
An interesting additional observation is that the proportion of efficient outcomes (1
chooses Leave) is (apart from the f7 treatment) decreasing in x. We find this result quite
intuitive, since the potential loss that 1 may experience by choosing Leave is increasing in x.
Next we investigate whether monetary efficiency is achieved only when player 1
expects to earn more than x. We use "more than" rather then "no less than" because the
slightest degree of risk aversion would make a player choose Tak  when his expectation of y
equals x. The procedure for measuring the subjects expectations is described in Section II.
H2: 1 chooses Leave only if 1's expectation of y is higher than x.
The relevant data are summarized in Table 4:
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f4 f7 f10 f13 f16
# of Leave choices (efficent outcomes) 12 6  8   4   1
# of Leave choices by players who
expect to get back more than x 11  2  0   0   1
TABLE 4: Efficiency and H2.
In the f4 treatment every player 1 chose L ave and in all except one case the player expected
to get back more than x, so H2 was violated in only one out of twelve cases. In the f16
treatment we have only one observation, which is in line with H2. However, in the f7, 10, and
13 treatments H2 finds little support. It seems that not only material self-interest motivates
many players 1 in their decison making. We comment further on this finding in section IV.A.
The next hypothesis concerns an aspect of reciprocal behavior by player 2. If she
considers 1 to be "nice" when he chooses Leave, then she may want to reward player 1 by an
appropriate choice of y>0. We find it reasonable to argue that the igher is x, the "nicer" is
player 1 by choosing Leave. If player 2 argues the same way, and if she has a preference for
reciprocating or responding in kind, then 2's preferred choice of y may depend positively on
the size of x. We expect an effect of this kind to motivate subjects in making their choices.
Therefore we expect to find positive correlation between x and player 2's choice of y. That is,
we test the following hypothesis which we expect to be able to reject:
H3: y and x are uncorrelated.
We use the Mann-Whitney U test based on ranks to test whether the samples of y comes from
populations with the same median. We do a pairwise comparison by treatments. The
nonparametric Mann-Whitney U is appropriate because the distributions are clearly not normal
(in fact, using the skewness and kurtosis test for normality we can reject the hypothesis that y
is normally distributed at a significance level of .0007). In Table 5 we report test results. A
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number in the intersection of a row and a column indicates, for the corresponding pair of
treatments, the probability of getting at least as extreme absolute values of the test statistic as
we observe, given that H3 is true.
 f4  f7  f10  f13  f16
f4 - .1124 .6033 .3408 .3865
f7 - .0941 .7290 .4705
f10 - .2253 .3123
f13 - .3123
f16 -
TABLE 5: Mann-Whitney U tests with pairwise comparisons of medians of y by treatments.
(Prob >z, where z is the test statistic)
Table 5 conveys a result we find surprising. At the five percent level, H3 is not rejected for any
of the pairs of treatments. We discuss this finding further in Section IV.B.
Why is player 2 choosing y>0 if she is not motivated by reciprocity considerations of
the kind we discussed above? One explanation may be that she chooses y>0 because she is
"averse to letting 1 down". This would be the case if she feels guilty if she chooses y "too low"
relative to what she believes to be 1's expectation of y.11 We therefore test for positive
correlation between y and 2’s expectation of 1’s expectation of y (conditional on 1 choosing
Leave; we henceforth suppress this qualification):
H4: y is positively correlated with 2's expectation of 1's expectation of y
                                           
11 An alternative but closely related explanation would be that player 2 has a preference for "meeting 1's
expectations" because 2 then experiences a comfortable "warm glow". We do not distinguish between this
explanation and the one involving guilt, although in what follows we choose to talk about guilt rather than a
warm glow. This way we avoid confusion with the warm glow effects of Andreoni (1990), which are not
related to expectations.
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We first use the Spearman rank correlation coefficient (rs) to test for the existence of
correlation between y and 2’s expectation of 1’s expectation of y. We run the test for the
entire 60 observations because, as shown above, the hypotheses that the choices of y in
different treatments come from the same distribution can ot be rejected. We find that rs=.36,
and that H4 can not be recected at the five percent level (in fact, H4 can be rejected only at
levels smaller than .0047). We interpret this as support for the hypothesis that y and 2’s
expectation of 1’s expectation of y are correlated.
After ensuring the existence of correlation, we measure the degree of correlation:
There is a positive correlation of .33 between y and 2’s expectation of 1’s expectation of y.
This is consistent with a theory of guilt based on psychological game theory. In Section IV.C
we elaborate a bit on this issue with reference to our experimental results.
IV. DISCUSSION
In this section we discuss the three main results of this paper: (i) Many players 1 choose Leave
even when their expectation of y was no greater than x. (ii) There is no correlation between x
and y. (iii) There is positive correlation between y and 2's expectation of 1's expectation of y.
A. Trust?
With reference to our finding about hypothesis H2, note that in the treatments with x equal to
f7, f10, and f13 it was not trust in the sense that player 1 expected 2 to give back more than x
that induced 1 to choose Leave. It is not just material self-interest that makes player 1 choose
Leave.Experiments in which subjects chose to give up money to other subjects are not new in
the literature—see the discussion in the introduction about the dictator game literature, or
witness many subjects behavior in the player 2 position of our game. However, as far as we
know, there is little documented evidence indicating that players are willing to give up money
in a way which increases monetary efficiency in situation where they expect a co-player to
treat them unfavourably.12
                                           
12 The findings of Bolle (1995) on an experimental game similar to ours is in line with this conclusion. He
asks player 1 "What will  Player 2 give back?", and 22 out of 41 subjects who chose the action similar to Leave
12
One may reasonably suspect that "trust" in the sense of "counting on others to give
back what one risks to lose" may explain observations about efficient outcomes in cases were
the classical theory predicts inefficient outcomes. Berg et al (1995, p137) discuss this issue.
However, the observations we make about the players 1's behavior indicates that such an
explanation is in need of qualification.
B. Reciprocity?
 Player 2 may think that player 1 is being "nice" by choosing Leave, and she may want to
reward 1 in proportion to how nice she considers him. We strongly suspected that a "the
higher is x, the nicer is 1 by choosing Leave" effect would make 2's choice of y positively
correlated with x across treatments. Therefore, we were much surprised to find no support for
a connection between x and y in the experimental data.
This result may be compared with findings of Berg et al (1995) that there appears to
be no connection between amount "sent" by player 1 and how much player 2 "sends back" in
their experimental game. Also van der Heijden et al (1996) report a similar result. Arguably,
the more money is sent, the nicer is player 1. In our set-up 1 cannot "choose how nice to be".
He can only be nice in one way (by choosing Leave). However, to some extent, we control for
how nice 1 is by using x as a treatment variable. This difference between the designs turns out
to be unimportant.13
C. Guilt?
                                                                                                                                   
gave answers no higher than (what corresponds to) x. However, since Bolle's and our questions differ (cf
Appendix 3), and since he did not reward subjects for accuracy, the analogy should be interpreted cautiously.
We also note that our findings do not contradict the evidence that "trust is an economic primitive" of Berg et al
(1995). They use a definition of trust that does not explicitly relate to expectations (see Berg t al p126).
13 These findings do not contradict Berg et al's (1995, p122) claim that "reciprocity exists as basic element of
human behavior", because their main definition of "reciprocity" (see p126) is built on different ideas from
those that motivate our hypothesis H3 (and their hypothesis A3). We note also that in Berg et al's "social
history" treatment (in which subject were informed about the choices made in earlier sessions before choosing
their own actions) they find "an increase in the correlation between amounts sent and payback decisions"
(p135). The issue of when and in what sense reciprocity is important is apparently a delicate one, and more
research seem necessary in order to disentangle various aspects.
13
Our finding that y is positively correlated with 2's expectation of 1's expectation of y is in line
with a  theory of guilt based on psychological game theory. Suppose that if 2's subgame is
reached, she will feel guilty if she gives 1 "too little" relative to what she expects hat 1
expects to get. And for a given such second-order expectation, the less 2 gives the more guilty
she feels unless she thinks she m ets 1's expectation. To model a "guilt effect" of this kind we
need the following notation:
 y'∈[0,1] is player 1's expectation of y
y''∈[0,1] is player 2's expectation of y'
Γ(x) can now be transformed into the following psychological game Π(x):
 Take
  y








1's payoffs in Π(x) depend only on what strategy profile is played, just as in Γ(x). However, 2's
payoffs are "belief-dependent". If a profile (Leave, y) is realized, her payoff is the sum of two
terms. The first term reflects 2's monetary, just as in Γ(x). The second term, in which g is a
non-negative constant, is "psychological" and captures the guilt effect. g represents player 2's
sensitivity to experiencing disutility by guilt. The effect of this second term is such that
whenever g>1 player 2 has a unique optimum response if 1 chooses Leave. Player 2 will
14
choose y=y''. This specification suggest that the correlation between y and y'' should be equal
to 1.14
This model is obviously simplistic and we leave for future research the task of
specifying a "realistic" model in which specific parameters can be reasonably estimated using
experimental data. We emphasize, however, that psychological effects cannot be captured
using standard game theoretic techniques. They are therefore qualitatively different from
several existing explanations of experimental findings that make reference to utility functions
that do not only depend on self-oriented, monetary arguments.15 Psychological games
distinguish themselves from standard games in that it is typically not possible to a priori
associate one specific utility vector with each possible strategy profile. Multiplicity of possible
equilibria may then be a much more frequent phenomenon than in standard games (see
Geanakoplos, Pearce, & Stacchetti (1989) and also Rabin (1993) for more discussion and
examples). Hopefully, experimental investigations can select which of these are relevant (we
like to think that the results reported here indicate that this may be feasible).
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APPENDIX 1
{ When the subjects arrived they were directed to their seats. The subjects in Room A received
the following written instruction. The instruction in Room B was identical except that "Room
A" was substituted for "Room B" everywhere in the text, and vice versa.}
Instruction   for persons in Room A
You are about to participate in an experimental study of decision making. The experiment will
last about an hour. In the experiment, each of you will be paired with a different person who is
in another room. You will not be told who this person is either during or after he experiment.
This is Room A, the other person is in Room B. As you notice, there are other people in the
same room with you who are also participating in th s experiment. You will not be paired with
any of these people.
After reading this instruction, we ask you to draw one envelope from this box. In the
envelope you will find a note with your 'registration number', which will be used throughout
the experiment. After observing this note, please put it back in the envelope so no one else will
see it. You will be asked to show this note later on when you will be paid. One envelope is an
exception to this rule. Instead of a number, this envelope contains the announcement 'Monitor
A'. The monitor will watch us while we carry out the experiment and assist us from time to
time. An analogous procedure to determine the 'registration number' and to select 'Monitor B'
is used in Room B. Every student will get f 8 as a show up fee, and in addition you may earn
money in the experiment. Some of the money will be given to you during the experiment, and
17
the rest at the nd of it. The monitor will receive a payment equal to the average payoff of all
other students in the experiment. All the money will be payed in cash.
From the moment you have drawn an envelope you are no longer allowed to talk or
communicate with the other participants. If you have a question, please raise your hand and
one of us will come to your table. As soon as everyone has taken his/her envelope, we will
distribute further instructions.
Are there any questions about what has been said up till now?
APPENDIX 2
{ After the subjects had read the instruction they received upon their arrival and clarifying
questions had be answered (these were rare), we distributed the following instruction
(identical in both rooms) in the session with the treatment in which x=f4 . Substitute "f 7, 10,
13, 16" for "f4" to get the instruction subjects received in the other sessions.}
The Procedure
The decision procedure will be as follows: Each person in Room A will get an additional f 4
and have two options:
(a) to take the f 4. In this case (s)he gives back an empty envelope, and the person with
whom he/she is matched in Room B does not get to split any money.
(b) to leave the f 4 in the envelope. In that case the person in Room B with whom
he/she is matched with will get to split  f20 between the two of them. That is, the person in
Room B decides how much of  f20 to give to the person in Room A, and how much of it to
keep.
The remainder of these instructions will explain exactly how this experiment is run:
Each person in Room A will get an e velope with f 4 and a note, and then, one at a time, will
go behind a curtain. Over there (s)he will be asked to write his/her registration number on the
note and put the note back into the envelope. Then, (s)he will have to decide whether to "take
it or leave it". That is, whether to "take" (and keep) the f 4 and give back the envelope without
the money, or to "leave" the f 4 in the envelope. The person in Room A will be asked to put
the envelope in a box near the experimenter. If the person in Room A decides to take he
money, then the person with whom (s)he is matched in Room B will not get any money to
split.  If the person in Room A decides to leave the money in the envelope, then the person
with whom (s)he is matched in Room B will get f20 to split between the two of them.
If the person in Room A leaves the f 4, then f20 will be made available to split between
the two paired players. The split will be determined by the person in Room B. Each  person in
Room B will be asked to decide how much money out of  f20 to give to the person in Room A
with whom he/she is matched.  The persons in Room B are asked to write their decisions on a
sheet of paper which is given to them, and then to put this sheet of paper in their envelope,
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and the envelope in a box near the experimenter. Note tha  this decision by the person in
Room B will be relevant only if the person in Room A chose to leave the f 4.
Then, Monitor A will take the box from Room A, and Monitor B will take the box
from Room B. Together with an experimenter, they will match each envelope of Room A with
the envelope of the person in Room B that has the same registration number, i.e. A1 will be
matched with B1, A2 with B2 etc. If the envelope of the person in Room A will be empty,
then no additional money will be given. If the envelope of Room A will contain the f4, then the
note in the envelope from Room B will determine how to split the f20 between the two
persons. The experimenter (with the monitors observing) will record the payoff of each of you.
You will be paid at the end of the experiment.
The experiment is tructured so that, apart from the experimenter, no one will know
the decisions of people in either Room A or Room B. Since your decision is private, we ask
that you do not tell anyone your decision either during or after the experiment.
APPENDIX 3
{ After the subjects' choices had been collected, in each treatment they received instructions
as follows.}
Question
{ To subjects in Room A only:}
Now we ask you to guess what was the average amount that persons in Room B chose to give
back to the persons in Room A. Your reward will depend on your accuracy.
{ To subjects in Room B only:}
We asked the persons in Room A to guess how much the person in Room B chose to give
back to them.  We now ask you to guess what was the average of the guesses of the persons
in Room A, but we consider only the persons that also chose to leave the money in the
envelope. In other words, we do not consider the the guesses of those who chose n t to leave
the money. If no one in Room A chose to leave the money, then you will be paid f5 regardless
of your choice. Otherwise, your reward will depend on your accuracy.
{ For all subjects the instruction continued as follows:}
In order to check whether your guess is accurate, one of the experimenters will
calculate this average, from the envelopes of the persons in Room B. You will be rewarded in
the following way: You will start with f5, and for every 1 cent of mistake, 1 cent will be
deducted from this f5. The mistake is the absolute value of  (your guess - the actual average).
For example, if you will guess accurately, you will get f5. If you miss by, say f2, (i.e. your
guess is either two guilders too high or two guilders too low), you will be paid f3. If your
mistake will be larger than or equal to f5, then you will not be payed at all for this part.
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Please write your guess and your registration number on this sheet, and wait for the
experimenter to collect the sheets.
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x=f4
Subject A1 A2 A3 A4 A5 A6 A7 A8 A9 A10 A11 A12 Average
T=0, L=1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 12/12
Guess 8 8.5 4 8 8 10 8.5 10 8 5 8.45 8 7.87
x=f7
Subject A1 A2 A3 A4 A5 A6 A7 A8 A9 A10 A11 A12 Average
T=0, L=1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 6/12
Guess 4.75 4.5 8 9 3 6 6 2.5 .75 8 7.5 4 5.33
x=f10
Subject A1 A2 A3 A4 A5 A6 A7 A8 A9 A10 A11 A12 Average
T=0, L=1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 8/12
Guess 10 6 10 8 10 5 10 7 8 5 10 1.25 7.52
x=f13
Subject A1 A2 A3 A4 A5 A6 A7 A8 A9 A10 A11 A12 Average
T=0, L=1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 4/12
Guess 9 3.5 6 6.25 9 0 5.5 4 0 9 4 0 4.69
x=f16
Subject A1 A2 A3 A4 A5 A6 A7 A8 A9 A10 A11 A12 Average
T=0, L=1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1/12
Guess 2 7 10 4 1.65 3 16.05 5.5 1 0 2.5 4 4.73
TABLE 1: Raw data on player 1. For each treatment, the first row indicates the registration
number of the subject, the second indicates the strategy choice (T=Take, L=Leave), and the
third row indicates the guess of the average y.
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x=f4
Subject B1 B2 B3 B4 B5 B6 B7 B8 B9 B10 B11 B12 Average
y 4 4 10 10 10 0 10 10 10 6 4 10 7.33
Guess 5 8 10 10 10 6.5 10 10 8.5 7 6 5 8.00
x=f7
Subject B1 B2 B3 B4 B5 B6 B7 B8 B9 B10 B11 B12 Average
y 10 0 8 10 7 9 10 0 2 2 0 0 4.83
Guess 7 4.5 9 5 8 7.5 8 8 7 9 8 9.5 7.54
x=f10
Subject B1 B2 B3 B4 B5 B6 B7 B8 B9 B10 B11 B12 Average
y 10 0 12 10 0 5 10 10 1 10 12.5 10 7.54
Guess 10 4.5 5 10 4 6 8.5 7 10 10 9 8 7.67
x=f13
Subject B1 B2 B3 B4 B5 B6 B7 B8 B9 B10 B11 B12 Average
y 10 5 1 16.5 8 10 8 0 7 8 0 0 6.12
Guess 8.5 5 6 7.5 8 7.5 8.45 7 8 3 0 13 6.83
x=f16
Subject B1 B2 B3 B4 B5 B6 B7 B8 B9 B10 B11 B12 Average
y 4 0 2 3 10 12 0 8 10 10 0 10 5.75
Guess 10 4.5 2 5 7.5 12 11 8 10 10 5 9 7.83
TABLE A2: Raw data on player 2. For each treatment, the first row indicates the registration
number of the subject, the second i icates the strategy choice, and the third row indicates the
guess of the average guess of y made by the subjects in room A who chose Leave
